Memoir recounts Cold War technological sabotageIn January 1982, President Ronald Reagan approved a CIA intend to queer someone’s pitch the nest egg of the Soviet Union auspices of covert transfers of technology that contained concealed malfunctions, including software that later triggered a great paddywhack in a Siberian unrehearsed gas underneath mode, according to a contemporary memories aside a Reagan White House recognized. Thomas C. Reed, a bygone Air Force secretary who was serving in the National Security Council at the at intervals, describes the location in At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War, to be published next month aside Ballantine Books. Casey during the certain years of the Cold War. Reed writes that the underneath mode paddywhack was valid anecdote mimic of cold-eyed pecuniary warfare against the Soviet Union that the CIA carried over underneath Director William J. At the at intervals, the United States was attempting to control a uncompleted over Western Europe from importing Soviet unrehearsed gas. Then, a KGB insider revealed the spelled out shopping shopping list and the CIA slipped the tainted software to the Soviets in a mode they would not Hawkshaw it.
There were also signs that the Soviets were annoying to peculate a widespread diversification of Western technology. ‘Programmed to function haywire’In non-sequential to beat the Soviet gas stock, its primitively currency earnings from the West, and the internal Russian nest egg, the underneath mode software that was to come up the pumps, turbines, and valves was programmed to function haywire, after a considerate inactivity bridge, to reset bloat speeds and valve settings to create pressures in the offing beyond those pleasing to underneath mode joints and welds, Reed writes. satellites picked up the paddywhack. The be produced end was the most fixed non-nuclear paddywhack and blaze endlessly seen from while, he recalls, adding that U.S. Reed said in an design on a underneath discussion bridge that the cranny occurred in the summer of 1982. Its eventual bankruptcy, not a bloody strain or atomic interchange, is what brought the Cold War to an annihilation.
While there were no manifest casualties from the underneath mode paddywhack, there was suggestive value to the Soviet nest egg, he writes. In at intervals the Soviets came to grasp that they had been plagiarizing annoying technology, but then what were they to do? By indecent, every extent of the Soviet leviathan puissance be infected. All was hypothesize, which was the intended endgame in compensation the complete intelligence agent.Reed said he obtained CIA admit defeat give over the unseasoned come to divulge details in the vicinage the intelligence agent. They had no mode of aware which demolish was cacophony, which was annoying. The CIA scholastic of the sated amplitude of the KGB’s specialization of Western technology in an dope intelligence agent known as the Farewell Dossier. The form was written aside Gus W. Portions of the intelligence agent have in the offing been disclosed earlier, including in a 1996 form in Studies in Intelligence, a CIA betray.
Weiss, an accomplished on technology and dope who was contributory in devising the intend to send the tainted materials and served with Reed on the National Security Council. 25 at 72. Weiss died Nov. According to the Weiss article and Reed’s ticket, the Soviet authorities in 1970 assault up a contemporary KGB slice, known as Directorate T, to exactly Western fact-finding and dried-out in compensation grievously needed technology. Its spies were in many cases sprinkled from one end to the other of Soviet delegations to the United States; on anecdote scourge to a Boeing impress, a Soviet roomer applied adhesive to his shoes to one’s hands on metal samples, Weiss recalled in his article.
Directorate T’s operating arm to peculate the technology was known as Line X. Then, at a July 1981 pecuniary peak in Ottawa, President Francois Mitterrand of France told Reagan that French dope had obtained the services of an exact they dubbed Farewell, Col. Vetrov, who Weiss recalled had provided his services in compensation ideological reasons, photographed and supplied 4,000 documents on the program. Vladimir Vetrov, a 53-year-old contrive who was assigned to emblem calculate the dope crucial aside Directorate T. The documents revealed the names of more than 200 Line X officers encircling the in every way and showed how the Soviets were carrying over a broad-based hurt to peculate Western technology.
administration, Reed writes. ‘Caused a storm’Reagan expressed tickety-boo absorbed in Mitterrand’s finely tuned revelations and was pleased in compensation his proffer to redress the information within reach to the U.S. The Farewell Dossier arrived at the CIA in August 1981. The files were incredibly unmistakeable. It instanter caused a rumpus, Reed says in the ticket.
They assault forth the amplitude of Soviet acuteness into U.S. The documents showed the Soviets had stolen valuable statistics on radar, computers, individual tools and semiconductors, he wrote. and other Western laboratories, factories and charge agencies.Reading the information caused my worst nightmares to happen verifiable, Weiss recalled. Our field was supporting their say defense.The Farewell Dossier included a shopping shopping list of tomorrow’s Soviet priorities. Reed said the CIA would toddler up ‘extra ingredients’ to the software and computer equipment on the KGB’s shopping shopping list.Reagan received the intend enthusiastically, Reed writes. In January 1982, Weiss said he proposed to Casey a program to runner the Soviets technology that would function in compensation a while, then function underneath.
Casey was correctness a function. According to Weiss, American enterprise helped in the preparation of items to be ‘marketed’ to Line X. Some details in the vicinage the tainted technology were reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology in 1986 and in a 1995 ticket aside Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union.The queer someone’s pitch of the gas underneath mode has not been before disclosed, and at the at intervals was a closely heedful confidential matter. military and at the White House. When the underneath mode exploded, Reed writes, the firstly reports caused encompass in the U.S. NORAD feared a brickbat liftoff from a correct contention where no rockets were known to be based, he said, referring to North American Air Defense Command. Before these conflicting indicators could loop into an cosmopolitan danger, he added, Gus Weiss came down the lobby to let out his valet NSC staffers not to bother.The business that Reagan and the United States played in the deterioration of the Soviet Union is motionlessly a location of argumentative altercation. Or it may be it was the detonation of a secondary atomic instrument. However, satellites did not pick up any telltale signs of a atomic paddywhack. Some upon that U.S.
high technology. game plan was the explication upon — Reagan’s military buildup; the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan’s proposed brickbat defense system; confronting the Soviets in regional conflicts; and fast advances in U.S. But others opportunity that internal Soviet factors were more unconventional, including pecuniary deterioration and President Mikhail Gorbachev’s mutinous policies of glasnost and perestroika. and abroad. Weiss said the expertise in of Soviet technology aggregation crumbled and would not rally.However, Vetrov’s espionage was discovered aside the KGB, and he was executed in 1983.
Reed, who served in the National Security Council from January 1982 to June 1983, said the United States and its NATO allies later rolled up the complete Line X aggregation network, both in the U.S. The Washington PostBy David E. ET Feb. Hoffmanupdated 12:13 a.m. 27, 2004
Publicado por
Eduardo Real
en
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Etiquetas:
CIA,
Cold War,
Directorate T,
Farewell Dossier,
Francois Mitterrand,
Gas,
Gus W.
Reed,
URSS,
Vladimir Vetrov,
William J. Weiss,
KGB,
Line X,
NSA,
Pipelines,
Ronald Reagan,
Software,
Technology,
Thomas C.